We explain the anomaly of election results between large cities and rural areas in terms of urban scaling in the 1948-2016 US elections and in the 2016 EU referendum of the UK. The scaling curves are all universal and depend on a single parameter only, and one of the parties always shows superlinear scaling and drives the process, while the sublinear exponent of the other party is merely the consequence of probability conservation. Based on the recently developed model of urban scaling, we give a microscopic model of voter behavior in which we replace diversity characterizing humans in creative aspects with social diversity and tolerance. The model can also predict new political developments such as the fragmentation of the left and 'the immigration paradox'.
phenomena. Alternatively, the fraction of factors not present in a city is 1 − r = b · log N 0 /N , where log N 0 = (1 − a)/b, and N 0 ≈ 1.8 · 10
14 is a hypothetical maximal diversity attainable in a city. Given a city with m factors present, the probability that an individual requires any number of the m factors that the city has, but none of the M − m factors that the city does not have is and averaging goes for cities of population N . Introducing the the scaling exponent β = 1 + M bq, this scaling curve then takes the universal form
where N is now the part of population conceivably susceptible to the given urban phenomena.
Scaling laws and universality have been observed in various aspects of the political process and elections [17] [18] [19] [20] , but the specific question of urban scaling of election results has not been addressed before. In the recent presidential elections in the US it has been noticed that votes for Democrats were disproportionally high in large cities 21 , and in the UK major cities also voted to remain in the EU. Here we show that election data in the US and in the UK show strong evidence of urban scaling. Using the concept that tolerance and diversity are strongly coupled in cities 22 , we develop a microscopic model of voter behavior that produces the macroscopic level urban scaling, explains the observed single parameter scaling, and describes the distribution of deviations from the macroscopic curve. For each election and for each party we can determine the scaling exponent β and the constant Y 0 independently from the fits. In Fig. 2B we plot log Y 0 as a function of β. We find a very strong (R 2 = 0.96) linear relation
for both parties and for all elections, with α = 12.111 and δ = 11.396. This indicates that the form of the scaling relation is independent of the party and election and has the universal form
where N is the voter turnout in a city, β is the exponent of the party and log N * = α. The numerical factor e δ−α is equal to 1/2 within numerical error and the parameter N * ≈ 182.000 is the average turnout of a US city of total population 429.000 in 2016. The remarkable property of this scaling relation is that on average at turnout N = N * the parties share the votes equally (4) and averaging for all cities yields
This equation guarantees that one of the exponents will be superlinear while the other sublinear (see supplementary materials and methods). Its numerical solution is shown in Fig. 2A . Thus, a model and an exponent derived for the results of one of the parties will determine the results of the other party via probability conservation. The strategy of one of the parties will result in a superlinear exponent, which can be explained by a adaptation of the GLPLH model, while the result of the party with the sublinear exponent is just a consequence of the other party's strategy.
A Scale-Adjusted Metropolitan Indicator 25 (SAMI) is the logarithmic deviation of the value Y i from the average scaling curve for a city with population N i
The GLPLH model predicts that SAMIs for a given city size range are normally distributed, and their variance can be expressed with the complexity parameter q and the number of complementary
, where log N is the mean of the logarithm of city sizes. It can also be expressed with the scaling exponent results of the Democrats, we can make a more detailed calculation for ten windows of city sizes. In We downloaded county-level historical US presidential election datasets from 1 . We calculated the total number of votes for the Democratic and Republican Party and the turnouts for all Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 2 by matching MSA's to the county level data 3 .
As for the UK, we downloaded electorate-level number of votes for Remain and Leave from the EU referendum result dataset 4 . We filtered the UK electorates based on whether they have a city in their core 5 , because the resolution of the data available about the referendum was not enough to consider using cities as units.
Data fit
For each year y, we assume that the expected value of the number of voters for a party (D, Democrat or R, Republican) scales with the size of a city in the following way:
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we can fit a line using OLS fit on the (log Y, N ) pairs for each election for both parties (we leave the year and party notations for simplicity reasons):
where the β denotes the slope, log Y 0 the the intercept of the fitted line, thus β is the exponent of the party in year y.
Pivotal point
If we assume that the intercept log(Y 0 ) is a function of β that changes slowly with β, and we know that β is always close to 1, then we can approximate log Y 0 around 1 linearly:
In the case of β = 1, it has to be true, that
the city-averaged voter fractions, because that would mean that every city votes as if all voters were dispersed homogeneously:
log(Y 0 (β)) = − log N * · β + log(p 0 ) + log N * By substituting it into the original scaling relation:
This implies that all fitted lines have to go through the (N * , p 0 N * ) point, because at N = N * , Y equals to p 0 N * regardless of the value of β. Also note, that N * is universal for both parties and for all elections. Thus, the scaling relations only have only parameter, the scaling exponent β.
Exponent relationship
In a given year, for every city i it holds that the number of Democrat and Republican voters is approximately equal to the turnout in the city:
Assuming scaling, the expected values of the Democrat and Republican voters can be substituted:
Because the exponents β D and β R are close to 1, the left hand side can be approximated to the second order
Let us average the equation over all cities in a year:
In the first order,
2 is small, we only use its first order approximation, thus: Since we did not have a city-level resolution, we took electorates that were centered around a city, and used only their turnouts as N , and number of voters as Y .
Because the distribution of city sizes in the UK is very uneven even on the logarithmic scale with London being disproportionally large, we weighted the points by 1/N in the OLS fit on the double logarithmic plot.
As in the case of the US Democrats, the Remain votes showed a strong superlinear scaling with β Remain = 1.08, while the Leave votes scale sublinearly β Leave = 0.91 The results suggest that a similar mechanism can be behind this phenomenon, as behing the Democrat voters in the US.
